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The Strict Scrutiny of Black and BlaQueer Life
Abstract
Furtive Blackness: On Blackness and Being (“Furtive Blackness”) and The Strict Scrutiny of Black and
BlaQueer Life (“Strict Scrutiny”) take a fresh approach to both criminal law and constitutional law;
particularly as they apply to African descended peoples in the United States. This is an intervention as to
the description of the terms of Blackness in light of the social order but, also, an exposure of the failures
and gaps of law. This is why the categories as we have them are inefficient to account for Black life. The
way legal scholars have encountered and understood the language of law has been wholly insufficient to
understand how law encounters human life. These articles are about the hermeneutics of law. While I
center case history and Black letter law, I am also arguing explicitly that the law has a dynamic life beyond
the courtroom, a life of constructing and dissembling Black life. Together, these essays and exercises in
legal philosophy are pointing toward a new method of thinking about law, a method that makes central
the material reality of the Black in black letter law.
They examine the semiotic relationships between race, gender, sexuality, and the law. While Furtive
Blackness is primarily concerned with regimes of policing—both by badged officers and deputized
citizens—Strict Scrutiny examines how the reconstruction amendments have been deployed and
redeployed to strictly scrutinize Black presence and appeals to justice and make them unintelligible,
irrelevant claims without justiciable and therefore outside of law the concern of law. Strict Scrutiny is a riff
on the phrase of judicial review that is primarily concerned with the Court’s inversion of the term to tightly
regulate and foreclose Black access to legal redress, as well as the police practice of strictly scrutinizing
Black presence and movement in public and private places. In essence, the ascription of furtivity makes
way for strict scrutinization; while the Black interior strategy of furtivity and refusal creates a survival
praxis that allows for a reprieve in the wake of these indignities.
These articles are an interpretation of the law as a tool of anti-blackness and an exposition of Black
thought and deed in response to anti Blackness, both in black letter law and day to day life. Both articles
are descriptive, interdisciplinary and rooted in traditional law and accented by Black queer and feminist
theory, critical race studies, performance studies and literary analysis.
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THE STRICT SCRUTINY OF BLACK & BLAQUEER LIFE

The Strict Scrutiny of Black and
BlaQueer Life
by T. ANANSI WILSON1*

Introduction and Reframe
This article builds upon the foundation laid in Furtive Blackness: On
Blackness and Being and is a direct continuation of that project. I want to
re-posit furtivity as not merely a subject status but also an interiority and a
practice of looking back, a practice of suspicion—a knowing to be suspicious
of police, law and white people—and how to be ready and prepared to evade
and bend and blend and make the right noise or silence. Furtivity then, is the
strategic embrace of both fungibility and individuality and the ocular
anticipation of how one is being seen and unseen. This is the strict scrutiny
of Black life: it is simultaneously the strict scrutinization of self—in order to
anticipate the fact of surveillance and discipline or reward—but also the
interpersonal and structural strict scrutiny that provides the formal logic for
quotidian contacts and violences by the state and citizens who claim the right
to operate “under the cover of law” on its behalf (George Zimmerman, BBQ
Becky, etc).
If furtivity describes the conditions of Black life, then strict scrutiny
marks the level of review, in and outside the auspices of law, in and outside
of Black bodies. In thinking about “Furtive Blackness” as a predicament, an
imposition and an instance of Black reimagination and way-making, I want
1. T. Anansi Wilson is an Affiliated Scholar of Law at the Center for Racial & Economic
Justice and Adjunct Professor of Law at UC Hastings College of the Law. They are also a PhD
Candidate in African & African Diaspora Studies at the University of Texas at Austin and received
their JD from Howard Law School. These articles originated in material form as draft dissertation
chapters, yet their style, concerns and politics originate in the work and living practices of earlier
Black and BlaQueer scholar-creator activists such as Toni Morrison, Pauli Murray, James Baldwin,
Ida B Wells Barnett, Frederick Douglass, W.E.B Du Bois, Audre Lorde, Essex Hemphill and other
Ancestors unnamed. A great deal of gratitude is owed to my dissertation Chair Stephen Marshall,
as well as advisors and early lookers Imani Perry, Hortense Spillers, Xavier Livermon, Saru
Matambanadzo, Michele Alexandre, Christina Sharpe, Anthony Farley, Amber Rose Johnson, La
Marr Jurelle Bruce, Saidiya Hartman, Julian Kevon Glover, Eric Johnson, Jossianna Arroyo,
Simone Browne, Devon Carbado, Lisa Crooms Robinson, Harold McDougall, Marlon Bailey, Alex
Cunningham, Khyree Davis, Alina Ball, Shauna Marshall, Gabriele Lara, Rory Little.
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to also think about the rigidity of the process of review. Black people do not
have standing—in court or commons—to define the scope of review nor its
level of inquiry. Much like Margaret Morgan, discussed in the previous
article reviewing the Fugitive Slave Law (and Act), Black people—and
Blackness itself—goes unrecognized as possessing a subject position of
citizenship; thereby, dispossessed and subordinated in the workings of law
practice, both in court and commons.
Black people live under the conditions of strict scrutiny. This is to say
that Black people are always under the highest level of review, being looked
at—and imagined—again and again, strictly. In this instance, I’m not
speaking of the Court’s usage of strict scrutiny but instead interrogating legal
language to reveal and turn this logic on its head. We live our lives on a
razor’s edge: standing on a blade that cuts us when being still, when moving,
when at work, when styling our hair, when covering our bodies, when
expressing our joy or registering our pain. Though there are formal limits
on this review, particularly in Fourth Amendment law, they provide little
material protection—generally only on police and formally sanctioned state
actors—and often function as logics for quotidian contact and invasions of
Black privacy and bodily autonomy.
I. A Riff on Strict Scrutiny, From Protection to Prison
In articulating “the strict scrutiny of Black life” I am again placing
myself in conversation with Devon Carbado. Carbado was speaking on a
panel with Imani Perry, Kimberle Crenshaw and Mari Matsudah, celebrating
the 25th anniversary of “intersectionality.” To reground Kimberle
Crenshaw’s concept of “intersectionality” within law, Marxism, materiality,
critical legal studies, and especially critical race studies, Carbado began to
riff on what he roughly titled “the strict scrutiny of Black life.”2 Here, I seek
to expand on this profound utterance. The concept is versatile and ironic. It
plays on “strict scrutiny” both as a form of legal review, meant to safeguard
“equal protection under the laws” via the Fourteenth Amendment and the
logics and function of permissible legal suspicion that allows and comingles
with what I have titled “Furtive Blackness.” We can think about “strict
scrutiny” as both the legally permissible level of suspicion applied to Black
rights and legal claims to “justice” and equity, that—through the inability of
Black access to Fourteenth Amendment protections—allows for unbridled
violence, disenfranchisement and terror manifesting through contact with
police and white citizens embodying ancestral, deputized policing powers.
2. American Studies Association Official, Presidential Session: Intersectionality and
Critical Race Theory, YOUTUBE (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elaIUgXzZE&ab_channel=AmericanStudiesAssociationOfficial.
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Strict scrutiny acts as a bulwark against the ability of Black harm to be
legally cognizable and provides a legally permissible logic to “Furtive
Blackness” as the signifier proving these quotidian contacts necessary and
renders Black flesh as available for discipline. Put differently, “strict
scrutiny” allows for the weakening of Black rights, marking them to be
presumptively either illegal, or legally incognizable, while “Furtive
Blackness” describes the ascription of the Black body/person itself as
always, already suspicious, sly and calling for preemptive discipline. The
chronological relationship between the two is unclear. Perhaps it is because
the fugitive, furtive Black body conspires to “steal away to freedom”: outside
of the status of property, coercive servitude, and debt, that its pleas for equity
and protection under the law are strictly scrutinized both in the courtroom
and in the classroom. The strict scrutiny of Black life, as a metaphor,
attempts to encapsulate the heightened level of legal—both jurisprudential
and policing—suspicion or review, of Black living that irreparably hinders
Black access to judicial relief and civil rights. On the other hand, “Furtive
Blackness” is concerned with suspicion of Black presence. In Carbado’s
estimation, Black people are strictly scrutinized on foot, in our cars, at work,
at the polls, in our homes and in hospital beds.3 This level of suspicion
enables a level of hyper visibility and disregard. To explicate these two
predicaments, we will turn to the cases of Bakke v. Regents of the University
of California and Rogers v. American Airlines and the corollary cases of
Lolade Siyonbolaa and Andrew Johnson. In the previous article, Furtive
Blackness: On Blackness and Being, we turned to the cases of BlaQueer
people like Gemmel Moore and various criminal statutes that target racialsexual minorities. Though we are not explicitly dealing with cases
concerning BlaQueer life, my position as a BlaQueer person makes these
concerns central and this essay is a BlaQueer reading of the failures, gaps,
and horrors of anti-discrimination law and the practice of intramural
targetability.
II. Defining Strict Scrutiny
In this section, I turn to several stories and a case that illustrate what I
am calling “the strict scrutiny of Black and BlaQueer life.” This metaphor
is meant to communicate the legal and cultural review, as well as the
surveillance and scrutiny visited upon Black and BlaQueer people. The
language is crafted in such a way that it should have clear meaning to legal
practitioners and scholars, humanities scholars, activists and laypeople alike.
“Strict scrutiny” is the highest level of judicial review over state action. It is
used to ascertain whether a certain law or action is constitutional.
3.

American Studies Association Official, supra note 2.
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Specifically, it is a level of review applied to legislation and government
actions—most often when a plaintiff sues the government for
discrimination—that presupposes those actions are facially unconstitutional.
When a law or action is subject to strict scrutiny, the government can only
overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality by supplying evidence that
there is 1) a “compelling state interest” and 2) that the law or action was
“narrowly tailored” to achieve that interest.4 This level of scrutiny is often
raised in equal protection claims and, when raised, the law in question must
have infringed upon a fundamental right or involve a suspect classification.
Fundamental rights are not only rights conferred by the constitution—
particularly the Bill of Rights—but also those found under the Due Process
Clause. These are typically rights so ingrained that they are integral to the
American experience. Other rights noted as fundamental—that are not in the
constitution—include the rights to: privacy5, contraception,6 interstate
travel,7 marriage,8 procreation,9 custody of one’s children,10 and voting.11
While largely understood as fundamental—and therefore unchanging—the
statuses of these rights are not immovable. For example, in Lochner v. New
York, the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the individual right to contract freely. However, just
thirty years later, the Court reversed itself in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
declaring that:
In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum
wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract.
What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom
of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation,
the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation.
But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which
requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the
health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people. Liberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due
process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject
and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.12
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972).
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015).
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678,684 (1977).
Meltzer v. C. Buck Lecraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 960 (1971).
Purcell v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1, 2 (2006).
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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Classification of a right as fundamental, as we can see above, is not
immoveable. Notions of liberty and due process are malleable and change
with time and place. Further, a close reading of the historical moment will
note the rising tensions between President Franklin Roosevelt—with his eye
toward a more labor friendly agenda—and the Supreme Court. It was not
long after this decision that he announced his famous “court packing” plan.
In addition, the right to marry is only recently fundamental, as applied to
non-heterosexual Americans. On June 26, 2015 in Obergefell v. Hodges, a
combination of four cases challenging bans on same-sex marriage, the Court
ruled that the right to marry is a fundamental right under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
III. Defining Suspect Categories
Suspect classifications are the instrument for interpreting invidious
discrimination. However, the gaps in what are considered suspect
classifications are also informative. They tell us who exists outside of legal
protection and thereby signal targetability. The language of suspect
categories lends itself well to the question of who is suspect or who is
suspicious in the eyes of the law. The language we have crafted here—the
metaphor and reality of furtivity—and the question of suspicion—
reasonable, permissible or otherwise—is most prevalent in law in this
instance. The large, agreed upon “suspect classifications” are race, religion,
national origin and alienage.14 Suspect categories are generally categories
of identity markers, cognizable by law, that have historically been exposed
to legal and extrajudicial forms of violence, discrimination or exclusion from
full participation in polity. Specifically, an individual is determined to be
part of a “suspect classification” or category if they are part of “discrete and
insular minority.”15 In order to determine whether a person is a discrete and
insular minority, the court applies a test with a variety of factors. However,
it is generally concerned with whether the person is: 1) part of a class that
has been historically disadvantaged, 2) part of class that has historically
lacked effective representation or access to the political process, 3) whether
the person has an inherent or immutable trait and 4) whether that trait is
highly visible.16 When a statute discriminates against a person based on
these traits—based on being a “discrete and insular minority” or a member
of a suspect classification—then the statute is presumed to be
unconstitutional and is subject to “strict scrutiny.”

13.
14.
15.
16.

Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664.
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S., 656, 660 (1973).
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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Missing here, curiously, are sex, gender, and sexuality. None of these
identities or communities have yet to be included as “suspect classifications”
or “insular and discrete minorities.” However, sex—determined as the sex
one is assigned at birth due to genitalia and cultural norms—is a “protected
class.”17 Protected classes are those deemed by Congress or states to be
protected from retaliatory state or private action or discrimination. Protected
classes are not protected via “strict scrutiny” but instead, intermediate
scrutiny.18 Intermediate scrutiny review is triggered when a statute
negatively affects a protected class. To pass muster, the law must further an
important government interest and do so in a way that is substantially related
to that interest.19
Ironically, the protection against sex-based discrimination came from
discrimination against men. In Craig v. Boren, an Oklahoma law prohibited
the sale of “non-intoxicating,” or 3.2% alcohol beer, to women under the age
of 18 and men under the age of 21.20 Craig Boren, a male in that age range,
challenged the law and argued that the ban on sales violated his right to equal
protection under the laws, as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment,
by establishing different drinking ages for men and women.21 While it is
ironic that the establishing of gender as a protected class sprouts from an
apparent curtailing of the rights of white men—to drink alcohol at that—is
even more ironic when we recall that the Fourteenth Amendment was
established to ensure the formal, complete citizenship of Black people and
the formerly enslaved. This is particularly prescient in the wake of a myriad
of bombings of churches, police killings of Black citizens and the
assassination of Martin Luther King, less than a decade earlier. The
Fourteenth Amendment had yet to finish its promise of guaranteeing equal
protection under the law—building upon the Thirteenth Amendment’s
promise to end the badges and incidents of slavery—yet it somehow found a
way to create a right for white men to drink without undue burdens.
IV. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke on Strict Scrutiny
It is generally understood that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended, as one of the Reconstruction Amendments, to grant “equal
protection under the laws” and “due process” to African descended people
in the United States. However, the history of the Reconstruction
Amendments is fraught and uneven. They were infamously gutted shortly
after their adaptation. The Slaughter-House Cases resulted in a holding that
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524.
Id. at 524.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976).
Id. at 192.
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the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to former slaves. Yet, crucially, the
Privileges & Immunities Clause only applied to federally held lands.22 The
promise of the Fourteenth Amendment was further curtailed in the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883, when the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of
1875, holding that it was unconstitutional because Congress did not possess
the power to regulate private activity.23 It is important to note that Civil
Rights Cases concerned at least five instances where Black people were not
given equal access to private businesses that performed public goods—such
as hotels, inns, transportation services and movie theaters—as white
citizens.24 It further held that Congress exceeded its Thirteenth Amendment
powers—in an attempt to cure the badges and incidents of slavery—strictly
reading the amendment as banning slavery, not private racial discrimination
or acts of subordination.25 This logic was cited and breathed new life in the
similarly infamous Plessy v. Ferguson, with the Court blessing “separate but
equal” as the law of the land.26 Black claims to actual citizenship and equal
protection under the law continued to remain uniquely suspect—if not all out
assaults on society—until the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1968. Soon after, the Court would again intervene, placing unique burdens
on Black requests for relief and protection, as evidenced by Bakke.27
As noted above, Black people constitute a “suspect classification,” as
we are historically oppressed and distinctly identifiable with immutable
characteristics (i.e., our flesh). Therefore, laws and policies that restrict the
freedoms of—or engage in discrimination against—Black people are subject
to strict scrutiny. However, in 1978, the Court began exploring a different
reading of the use of “strict scrutiny,” as well as the role of the Fourteenth
Amendment.28 This novel interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
well as strict scrutiny as a standard of review, essentially undid a generation
of formal precedent. The law as explicitly articulated through the judiciary:
in favor of a new modality that strictly scrutinized Black life, particularly
when attempting to equitably access the laws or gain redress from
interpersonal and systemic discrimination. Indeed, Black living—and the
understanding of the practice of Black life and living as furtive—becomes
simultaneously legible and illegible for the Court, depending on its needs.
In particular, the history of anti-Black oppression and oppression
schema become evidence, not for the need of specific, particularized policies
or legislation to combat the afterlives of slavery or Jim Crow, but instead as
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 16 (1873).
United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883).
Stanley, 109 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 270.
Id.
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a new type of precedent: damning policies or legislation that are meant to
affect one race over another. Of course, this has the effect of freezing the
status quo—and at best—creating a floor for and maintaining the current
material reality of Black (un)citizenship and allowing the costs and fruits of
whiteness to be born and enjoyed at their current levels of production. In
this way, the current value of one’s interest in whiteness as property29, is
protected by law; in fact, uniquely protected by laws that were meant to
articulate a complete Black citizenship. Yet, even in the face of
reconstruction and intentional formal equality, the power relationship
between Black and white, slave and master, fugitive and plaintiff, criminal
and publics, furtive being and citizenship remain intact.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke the Court ruled in
favor of Allan Bakke, a white man who had twice been denied admission to
the University of California at Davis Medical School.30 Bakke argued that
he was unlawfully discriminated against—in violation of Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment—because the school used an affirmative action program that
included strict racial quotas.31 The school reserved sixteen out of one
hundred slots for racial minorities.32 To buttress the argument of unlawful
racial discrimination against him, Bakke offered that the admitted students
had “significantly low” benchmark scores, including MCAT and GPA
results.33
In a 5–4 decision, the Court agreed with Bakke. It held that race can
permissibly be used to further school diversity, but only on a case by case
basis and so long as when race is used, it must be among other factors
considered for admittance. The Court held that California had run afoul of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate to refrain from denying “to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” by denying
white students sixteen out of the one hundred seats solely due to their race.34
The Court rendered the historical discrimination against Black people as
wholly irrelevant and instead marked its ruling as race neutral, noting that
quota systems that preferred one race over the other was “odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”35
Further, the Court noted, because California’s program had intended to right
29. Harris, Cheryl I., Whiteness as Property, #? HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); see also UCLA
School of Law Research Paper No. 06-35, https://ssrn.com/abstract=927850. Harris shows how
whiteness evolved from a racial identity into a form of property. She argues that whiteness became
the basis for racialized privilege and power; from slavery and colonial conquest to the present.
30. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 278.
31. Id. at 279.
32. Id. at 289.
33. Id. at 277.
34. Id. at 289.
35. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
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past racial discrimination, it had discriminated against “one group for no
other reason other than race or ethnic origin” and held that the program was
unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.36
The Court did, however, note that the state had a “legitimate and substantial
interest in” eliminating the effects of “identified discrimination.”37
However, to tend to the remedying of these injuries, the states must engage
in legislative, administrative or judicial efforts that document and prove
specific and illegal racial discrimination; a much higher standard than what
the Court marked as “more focused than the remedying of the effects of
‘societal discrimination,’ an amorphous concept of injury that may be
ageless in its reach into the past.”38 This had the obvious effect of both
limiting the formal identification of complex, systemic injuries while also
marking claims of harm—and appeals to redress—as suspect, in effect, as
the original sins that necessitated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
V. Suspicion, Standing, and Malleable Rights
In its review of Bakke, the Court utilizes the Fourteenth Amendment,
as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to not only create a pro-White
jurisprudence of ceteris paribus, but to weaponize the tool of high judicial
review to strictly scrutinize both Black life and living, as well as Black
attempts to use law as a mechanism to ensure formal and social equity. In
other words, Black quests for complete and fully realized citizenships are
suspicious “legal” gestures that are presumed unconstitutional as violations
of (white people’s) due process and equal protections right. That is to say,
the Court has transformed the Fourteenth Amendment into a tool to preserve
“whiteness as property”39 and Black attempts at fully realized citizenship are
strictly scrutinized, furtive gestures presumed to run afoul of law and order.
This is not dissimilar from what Black folks once sang as “stealing away to
freedom/Jesus.” In the lyrics from the negro spiritual “Steal Away” we not
only see a desire to attain freedom or citizenship, but the recognition that
Black freedom then— and perhaps now— is considered a type of theft of
property and power. During enslavement, property was unfettered access to
Black flesh and labor and can be broadly understood as the power to
subjugate Black people as a matter of law and practice. In Bakke, the Court
is not talking about reinstituting slavery but, instead, the logics of the power
differential that makes manifest the legal difference between Black and
white, between (un)citizen and citizen. It attempts to freeze in time—
36.
37.
38.
39.

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287–320.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Harris, supra note 29.
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through legal review—a power differential that maintains the central logic
of slavery. It does so by rendering Black people as furtive beings—those
inherently sly, suspect and untrustworthy—and strictly scrutinizing our
(in)actions as either punishable by law or outside of the law’s realm of
protection.
First, the Court accepts and leans into Bakke’s alleged harm. He was
twice denied entry to a particular medical school. In Bakke’s telling—and
the Courts presumption—he deserved to be admitted (or at least more so than
the Black and other applicants of color) because his “benchmark” numbers
were “substantially higher” than those of admitted non-White students.40 To
the Court, Bakke’s harm and his evidence are legible and logical; not suspect
or audacious. Here, the Court supplants the decision-making process of the
school, and leans into Bakke’s narrative of harm; transforming the facts of
the case from being about remedying systemic anti-Black oppression to
being chiefly concerned with Bakke’s white right to equal protection. In this
way, the Court creates a scenario in which attempts to remedy past racial
oppression and discrimination against Black people and other racial
minorities are strictly scrutinized, and, even then, those same efforts or
avenues to reparation must be equally accessible to white people. That is to
say, to remedy present and past histories of white supremacist privilege,
terror, and power; one must also be sure that these remedies provide some
unencumbered pathway to benefit those privileged and empowered by the
current system of racial power. To do otherwise renders the law and policies
in question unconstitutional under the gaze of strict scrutiny, and in the name
of the “equal protection under the laws,” denies the promise given to the
newly unenslaved.
In the Courts decision to supplant the stated goal of the university—as
well as the harms, rights, and desires of the sixteen admitted students—it
begins to strictly scrutinize the presence of Black and non-white students by
casting suspicion on their presence and marking the mechanisms permitting
their presence as dangerous and outside the law. They are placed both in and
outside of law; their presence—or access to educational resources—is
reviewable by law via its purported effect on Bakke’s rights, yet the systemic
and interpersonal harms (i.e., racism) that makes this particular pathway for
their presence necessary are unintelligible to the Court. Their desires to gain
a medical education—no different than Mr. Bakke’s—are illegible to the
Court. These desires lack standing, meaning they are unable to be seen or
heard in a court of law. The court dislodges and discards these desires by
creating a scenario that posits a “deserving” white male and his hard earned
rights against an unnamed, unthought racial minority—instead of comparing
his credentials to those admitted white students—but also by calling for and
40.

Bakke, 438 US at 274.
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demanding state sponsored proof of racial discrimination that is both
documented and endorsed by the state government and illegal. This process
of disembodying Black people from personhood and standing, in favor of the
protection of white rights, is not dissimilar from what happened to Margaret
Ashmore in Prigg v. Pennsylvania; in fact, this is a doubling down on the
precedent of strictly scrutinizing Black life.41 Margaret Ashmore went from
being a free citizen of Pennsylvania, wrongly kidnapped and held against her
will, to a lifeless, fleshy, vessel of property through which the Court
established the rights of states, the federal government, and individual slave
owners.42 In that case neither Margaret Ashmore, nor her children, were
mentioned as parties, instead her kidnapper and those with whom he worked
were given standing and the gaze of the Court. In both Bakke and Prigg,
harms against Black people become recognizable if, and only if, those harms
can be rerouted into rights and powers for white citizens; or, alternatively,
when the remedies for those harms can be reformed as bulwarks against
further eradication of white rights and power under law.
The Court has inverted the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
deciding Bakke, the Court is not so cavalier as to ignore the realities of
historical— and certainly not present—racism and discrimination. To the
contrary, the Court successfully utilizes the historical and present reality of
anti-Black racial terrorism and discrimination to create a formal logic of
universal “non-discrimination.” The Court does so by using the history of
anti-Black terrorism and formal discrimination as a cautionary tale of what
happens when race is taken into account.
The craven, terrorist,
discriminatory nature of the Black Codes, Jim Crow, and other laws are used
to foreshadow the dangers of considering Black and non-white races—and
histories of discrimination—as legally valid. While some might argue this
is a type of color-blind jurisprudence, to the contrary, this is jurisprudence
that functionally freezes current racial power differentials in place. The
Court transforms the Fourteenth Amendment from a corrective measure, into
a preventative one. Where it was often used to correct and strike down laws
that maintain or demand the inferior legal status of Black people, it has
instead become a measure to strike down laws that attempt to create and
demand racial equity under the law because, in their logic, these laws affect
and target the rights and privileges of white people. The history of antiBlack racial discrimination and terror becomes the logic for anti-Black
jurisprudence: acknowledging race, namely Blackness, becomes the issue
because to do so, would require a reworking of how power and citizenship
are distributed.

41.
42.

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 538, 608 (1842).
Id.
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VI. Brief Explanation of Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer .
. . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
— Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 196443
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 broadly prohibits
discrimination based on categories similar to those prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination based on color, race, religion, sex and national origin.
Employers—including governments, colleges and universities, employment
agencies and labor organizations—with more than 15 employees are bound
by Title VII. Discrimination is prohibited in any aspect of employment
including, but not limited to: hiring and firing; compensation, assignment or
classification of employees; transfer, promotion, layoff or recall; job
advertisements; recruitment; testing; use of company facilities; training and
apprenticeship programs; fringe benefits; pay, retirement plans and disability
leave; assertion of rights under Title VII; and other terms and conditions of
employment.
Title VII grants the harmed party 180 calendar days from the instance
of discrimination to file a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. However, if the violation of Title VII is also a
violation of a law enforced by a state or local agency, then the harmed party
has 300 days to file a complaint.44
A. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
Rogers is jurisprudentially distinct from Bakke because it concerns
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment or its Equal Protection Clause.45 While the courts
have long acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
various forms of discrimination previously mentioned, it is not often used in
employment scenarios. This difference is important and legally substantial,
because the Fourteenth Amendment addresses state or government action or
policy, while the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reaches the activity and policies
of private actors and most Americans are employed by private actors, rather
43.
44.
45.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5.
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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than government agencies. I bring Bakke and Prigg together to further
explore the concept of the “strict scrutiny of Black life” and how this
jurisprudential method of scrutinization and suspicion operates in quotidian
Black life as a disciplining regime, under the guise of protection, further
marking Black bodies, Black life and Black movement as inherently outside
of the protection of law, and, when encountered by law, readily available for
discipline.
In Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc, Renee Rogers—an African American
flight attendant, employed by the company for eleven years—sued for sex
and racial discrimination pursuant to Title VII, after the company demanded
that she stopped wearing cornrows and placed her hair in a bun.46 The
company allegedly based this decision on a change in their employee
grooming policy.47 Ms. Rogers then sued, arguing that the ban on wearing
cornrows constituted both sex and racial discrimination.48 The trial court
dismissed the sex discrimination claims arguing that the claims were
unfounded because both men and women were banned from wearing
cornrows.49 Ms. Rogers, in her opposition to a motion to dismiss her racial
discrimination claim, explains that cornrows are:
Historically, a fashion and style adopted by Black American
women, reflective of cultural, historical essence of the Black women
in American society . . . The style was “popularized” so to speak,
within the larger society, when Cicely Tyson adopted the same for
an appearance on nationally viewed Academy Awards presentation
several years ago . . . It was and is analogous to the public statement
by the late Malcolm X regarding the Afro hair style . . . At the
bottom line, the completely braided hair style, sometimes referred
to as corn rows, has been and continues to be part of the cultural and
historical essence of Black American women . . . There can be little
doubt that, if American adopted a policy which foreclosed Black
women/all women from wearing hair styled as an “Afro/bush,” that
policy would have very pointedly racial dynamics and consequences
reflecting a vestige of slavery unwilling to die (that is, a master
mandate that one wear hair divorced from ones historical and
cultural perspective and otherwise consistent with the “white
master” dominated society and preference thereof).50

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
Brief for Plaintiff in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 4–6, 14–5, 527, Roger, F. Supp. at 232.
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Predictably, the trial court disagreed with her argument that she was
being uniquely discriminated against as a Black woman because her hair is
an “‘easily changed characteristic,’ and even if socioculturally associated
with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for
distinctions in the application of employment practices by an employer.”51
The court goes on to say that:
Moreover, the airline did not require plaintiff to restyle her
hair. It suggested that she could wear her hair as she liked while off
duty, and permitted her to pull her hair into a bun and wrap a
hairpiece around the bun during working hours. A similar policy
was approved in Carswell v. Peachford Hospital . . . Plaintiff has
done this, but alleges that the hairpiece has caused her severe
headaches. A larger hairpiece would seem in order. But even if any
hairpiece would cause such discomfort, the policy does not offend a
substantial interest.52
At first brush, Rogers might be read as having little importance, in
comparison to the weighty Fourth and Thirteenth Amendment arguments
raised in the previous essay, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment concerns
raised in Bakke. However, that would be a grave mistake. While the Fourth
Amendment raises serious concerns about state and police encounters,
contact and engagement with Black bodily integrity, privacy and the logic
that precedes it, Bakke largely concerns itself with the ability of state, local
and federal governments to engage in Black conscious reparatory measures.
Rogers, on the other hand, via the Civil Rights Act of 1964, reaches into the
private sphere and forces us to reckon with the way the law continues to
permit or encourage the regulation of the Black body and compromise claims
to personhood and indeed, equal protection under the law.
In Rogers, we are not confronted with the activity of police officers or
furtivity per se, but instead with how Black people are allowed to be present
and exist in the workplace. Put differently, this case moves the context of
subordination on the street, or in one’s car, to the place of employment,
where one makes their living. Instead of regulating Black living, the Court
instead opts to allow for de facto and formal regulation of how that living is
supported, sustained and made possible. In Rogers, the Court moves from
marking her/us merely furtive in nature and instead—at least in this terrain—
opts to strictly scrutinize Black presence and one’s method of being present.
51. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232
52. Id. at 233. Cf. EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding
no-beard policy despite showing that some Black men had difficulty complying due to racially
linked skin disease).
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In other words, this is not dissimilar from the logics that enabled the poll tax.
The Court would not dare say that Black people are categorically unable to
vote under the law, but instead narrows the opportunity to do so and creates
unique burdens for the franchise to be operated. Therefore, allowing and
encouraging the poll worker, the election official, and the public at large to
strictly scrutinize the act of voting and the concept of Black enfranchisement.
Here, similarly, the Court smartly opts against saying Black women cannot
work or are unfit to be flight attendants, but strictly scrutinizes how the Black
woman before it can do such work, on a basis that has no effect on the quality
of her labor and generally without regard for it. The concern for the court,
as well as American Airlines, is not Ms. Rogers performance of employee
duties—she had been employed for 11 years—but instead on what Thomas
Jefferson has called “manners,”53 the method of performance, or
embodiment of servitude, that bends Black appearance, self-styling, and
personhood to the will and desires of the white gaze. That Ms. Rogers would
attempt to assume personhood, if not citizenship, by appearing with hair that
was not only natural, but styled in a way that celebrates and asserts a level
of Black individuality—and therefore autonomy—is an affront to embedded
power dynamics and implied duties. By styling her hair in a way that
differentiated her from her white colleagues —making her Black selfhood
central—Ms. Rogers engaged in a fugitive practice that marked in her flight
or defiance from centuries of bending to conscripted desires of pleasure and
being to a white owner, and later a white supremacist gaze.
There is no doubt—as Kimberle Crenshaw has argued before—that the
Court’s scrutiny of Ms. Rogers operates on an intersectional axis, namely
sex and race. And, as I have argued in other writings, as well as the previous
article, and explained the notion of “BlaQueerness,” there is no separating
race, gender and sexuality from each other, even if and when gender is
fleetingly (un)attainable. In Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race & Sex,
Crenshaw analyzes several cases that show the Court marking multiple,
simultaneous oppressions, or discriminations, as outside of the framework of
law. In one case, Mosley v. General Motors, the Court is confronted with
Black women bringing a claim against General Motors for sex and racial
discrimination—not dissimilar form this case—where the Court reaches a
similar conclusion.54 In this case, the women had been previously employed
as clerks or phone attendants due to a wartime shortage of male labor. The
white women who previously held those positions had taken up positions in
the factory, as the men—both Black and white—had been deployed. When
the men returned, the Black women were fired and denied employment as
both clerks and factory workers. They sued, arguing they had been
53.
54.

Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the state of Virginia, https://www.loc.gov/item/03004902/.
Mosley v. General Motors, 497 F. Supp. 583, 591 (1980).
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discriminated against for their race, in the case of clerical jobs, and for their
gender, in respect to the factory jobs. The Court denied their claim,
reasoning that they were both moot because Black men were employed at
the factory, hence no racial discrimination, and that (white) women were
employed as clerks, hence no gender discrimination. Therefore, the
employer had neither discriminated solely on race nor gender. The Court
declined to understand their intersectional argument, in that they faced a
unique, compounded experience as Black women.
For Ms. Rogers, the appellate court slightly modified this argument—
as Ms. Rogers did not claim she was being treated differently than Black
men, or that white women were similarly allowed to wear cornrows—and
instead held that the claim here was beyond the scope of law, due to her
“mutable” characteristics.55 That is to say, the company’s regulation of her
personhood was permissible—and within the protection of the law—because
there were measures she could take to make the case moot, such as make
illegible or undetectable her hair. The burden of her hair then, was not the
company’s to bear.56 It was hers and hers alone. The Court agreed that she
would have a strong claim for racial and speech based discrimination if she
were to have worn an “Afro/Bush” style because of its political association
and because it was natural.57 While this is true, and perhaps facially “fair,”
it is nefarious in effect. In strictly scrutinizing her hair and appearance, the
Court affirms and mandates a singular natural hairstyle as permissible and
within lawfulness—while refusing to do the same for white employees—an
invasion of personhood, privacy, and dignity by fiat. Further, the Court
shows little regard—with an acidic humor—for the harm caused by the
remedy. In responding to her concern about the damage and pain of folding
her hair into a bun, the Court encourages her to merely “add a hairpiece.”58
Finally, in remarking that she is “free” to wear her hair as she feels outside
of the workplace, the Court again reminds Ms. Rogers of her unfree status
within the workplace, a “badge” and “incident of slavery” under any serious
reading of the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing the aforementioned.59
This differs significantly from the work of Kenji Yoshino and his
theorization of “covering.”60 While Yoshino speaks to problem of muting
oneself due to racism—particularly its social and cultural pressures—I’m
speaking to a badge and incidence of slavery which is reenacted as invidious
discrimination and retaliation against Blackness that is legally protected.61
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 232.
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 233.
Id. at 231.
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, YALE L.J. 111 (2001).
Yoshino, supra note 60, at 781.
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VIII. Precedent as Prologue
Precedence is perhaps the most hallowed concept in law and law
making. It allows the citizen, practitioner, and state to craft laws and policies
that are likely to withstand jurisprudential scrutiny. Beyond the land of
lawmaking and policy procuring, however, precedent and judicial rulings—
even those that are nonbinding—signal to the aforementioned groups a
method, and standard, of regard and disregard. Law and lawfulness are
dichotomous to illegality and criminality; signaling what is to be done,
encouraged and celebrated and what is to be scorned, disciplined and brought
to heal, all quotidian, necessary community labors and duties of good
citizenship. It should come as no surprise then, that jurisprudential decisions
and logic find themselves mirrored, remade, solidified, and acted out in
quotidian culture and practices. For Black people, even those attempting to
“live otherwise,” law itself becomes an anticipatory manual for how we will
be (dis)regarded by non-white people, particularly those operating “under
the cover of law” or, in the case of those like BBQ Becky, those who see
themselves as the extension, beneficiary or embodiment of the states policing
power. Two recent cases make this extremely clear. “I fought to get here,”
Jean-Louis told CNN in an interview Friday. “I'm not here to qualify my
existence. You don't come to the Ivies for that.”62
On May 11, 2018 Lolade Siyonbola—a Yale African Studies graduate
student—fell asleep while studying in her dorm’s common room.63 Another
student, a white woman, Sarah Braasch, later walked in, turned on the lights
and exclaimed that she was “calling the police.”64 Siyonbola, irritated, then
went to Braasch’s room, with a camera recording to Facebook Live, to ask
why she was calling the police. “I have every right to call the police,”
Braasch said after snapping a photo of Siyonbola. “You cannot sleep in that
room.” “Continue,” Siyonbola said, then taunted her, “Get my good side.”65
Braasch had already called the police, telling them that “a woman she
did not know” was sleeping in the common room.66 When the officers
arrived, they took Lolade aside and repeatedly asked her for identification,
which she initially resisted stating, “I deserve to be here. I pay tuition like

62. Dakin Andone, This Allegedly Wasn't the First Time This White Yale Student Called the
Cops on a Person of Color, CNN (May 12, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/11/us/yalesecond-black-student-sarah-braasch/index.html.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cleave R. Wootson Jr., A Black Yale Student Fell Asleep in Her Dorm’s Common Room.
A White Student Called Police, WASH. POST (May 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/grade-point/wp/2018/05/10/a-black-yale-student-fell-asleep-in-her-dorms-common-room-awhite-student-called-police/.
66. Andone, supra note 62.
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everybody else . . . I’m not going to justify my existence here.”67 After she
relented, showing the officer’s her ID, the officers told her that she was not
harassed by them and that “every time there’s an interaction with police
officers doesn’t mean there’s harassment.” She responded, “You have a good
night. . . I’m not going to have a good night after this.”68 The police
eventually told Braasch that Lolade was “authorized to be here” and that it
was not “a police matter.”69
In the above instance, we witness the quotidian manifestation of the
jurisprudential strict scrutiny articulated in Bakke. In that case, the Court
was suspicious of, and strictly scrutinized the presence of the unnamed Black
and people of color students. It was suspicious of, and strictly scrutinized
their presence, as well as the state’s logic for allowing and creating a
mechanism for their presence. When the state positioned the affirmative
action—or what I would call corrective action—program as one of racial
redress, the Court was suspicious of not only the ends, but the means and the
very facts of history that make the case for redress (i.e., mandating state
studies, various data, legislative and administrative action.) This facially
functioned as a burden on the state but in effect, it was a burden of a
presumption of suspicion—articulated through an inverted theory of strict
scrutiny—that would legally and socially mark Black presence in colleges
as always, already curious, suspicious and deserving of inquiry. The
corollary to this, of course, is the marking of the presence of white students
as normative, routine and a phenomenon—if not a privilege—to be
protected.
In the scene above, Lolade is doing what most graduate students do:
fall asleep after a long period of studying and writing. Her books and papers
are clearly distributed around her.70 These badges of a typical college student
should indicate her belonging. When Braasch sees her, she announced she
was “calling the police.” The books and papers indicated nothing, or, were
subsumed by the presence of a Black person lounging in the lounge. If
Lolade’s study materials did nothing to indicate her privilege to be present,
then her flesh, the color of her skin operated as a fire star alarm noting her
invasion into a space not meant to her. The calling of the police, as a first
response—not unlike that of BBQ Becky beforehand—marks Lolade’s
transmutation from Yale graduate student to Black trespasser, into a space,
67. Katherine Mangan, A White Student Called the Police on a Black Student who was
Napping, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUCATION (May 10, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/a-white-student-called-the-police-on-a-black-student-who-was-napping-yale-says-its-deep
ly-troubled/#:~:text=A%20female%20police%20officer%20said,make%20sure%20you%20belon
g%20here.%E2%80%9D&text=Lolade%20Siyonbola%2C%20a%20master's%20student,to%20j
ustify%20my%20existence%20here.%E2%80%9D.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Mangan, supra note 67.
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a lounge, not meant for entry. Her crime—not one of actual threats or
endangerment—was her presence. Braasch, in her performance of an
internalized and sociocultural duty to strictly scrutinize Black people—as
well as her clear marking of Lolade as furtive, even when at rest—appeals to
the power of the state to discipline and remove Lolade.
The desire to discipline—and invoke state and personal power—
becomes more evident in her declaration to Lolade that she “cannot sleep
here,” her invocation of a “right to call the police,” and ominous warning
“not to get on my bad side.” Unsaid here, is her prior instance of calling the
police on Black students on campus for merely being Black and present.
Lolade is not only being disciplined and chastised for sleeping in the
common room, but for being present —and resting—without leave or
permission from Braasch. In calling the police she exclaims that Lolade is
“a woman I don’t know.” This marking of Lolade as furtive and outside of
the rights given to students is further made clear in her interactions with the
police. The police demand, repeatedly, that she produces an ID; while she
protests and insists on her “right to be here,” specifically noting that she
“pays tuition like everyone else.” The mechanism of strict scrutiny, and its
practice in policing, is clear here. Lolade’s presence is assumed to be invalid
until, and unless, she can meet the burden of proof to overcome the
suspicion—that of the summoned officers and the white hallmate—that
could very well have her in a life or death situation. It is important to note
here that the arrival and decision of the police to engage Lolade is a result of
their belief in the feelings of Braasch. Braasch’s fear, annoyance, and
suspicion is proof enough to marshal police resources to interrogate Lolade’s
presence, while taking Braasch’s reaction as normal, expected, and beyond
reasonable investigation. In this scenario, much like in Bakke, Lolade is
made to justify her presence, in other words, to make legible to law
enforcement that presence is “authorized” by overcoming the presumption
of trespass visited upon her via a legal and cultural practice of strict scrutiny
of Black presence, bodies, and quotidian life.
On December 18, 2018 Andrew Johnson, a Black high school wrestler
in New Jersey, was faced with a level of scrutiny not dissimilar from that of
Ms. Rogers; he could cut his hair or change his “profession.”71 Just before
his match began, standing in front of a full auditorium, Johnson was
informed that he could either have his locs cut immediately or forfeit his
match (video).72 Forced to choose between upending his wrestling career
71. Staff Reports, Wrestling Haircut Rule Confusion Prompted Buena to Cancel Match,
COURIER POST (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.courierpostonline.com/story/sports/high-school/
wrestling/2019/01/11/nj-wrestler-haircut-rule-confusion-prompts-buena-regional-cancel-matchandrew-johnson-alan-maloney/2546251002/.
72. Mike Frankel (@MikeFrankleJSZ), TWITTER (Dec 20, 2018 9:54 AM), https://twitter.
com/MikeFrankelJSZ/status/1075811774954463235.
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and maintaining his bodily integrity and racial identity, he allowed his hair
to be cut.73 It was done haphazardly, by a random white female employee,
with a pair of scissors usually used for arts and crafts.74 In the video, we can
hear loud sounds from the audience that seem to be a mix between roaring
applause and shock.75 While there was widespread condemnation after the
fact—particularly after it had been revealed that the presiding referee had
referred to a peer as “nigger”—no one moved to intervene in the moment.76
It made no difference that Johnson had a haircap, that he had been using
all season, and had attempted to use it.77 Instead, the referee applied and
interpreted the hair length rule, with the interpersonal equivalence of
jurisprudential strict scrutiny, policing not only Johnson’s hair—and by
proxy his Blackness—but also the style of haircap he used. His review of
Jackson’s hair acted as a stand-in for his review of Jackson’s presence as a
whole. His ability to wrestle—as any public-school student who had made
the team—was called into question due to the style and length of his hair. In
order to wrestle—he would later go on to win—he would not only have to
pay a social tax of deference and subordination, but he would also pay the
price of the forfeiture of bodily autonomy and integrity. The price of entry,
the price of presence, is understated here because most do not understand the
hours and years of maintenance to attain locs of that length; nor the time it
will take to create and maintain a similar hairstyle. The video shows his locs
being cut down to the root on the sides, and randomly cut on the top. In
order to achieve his initial style again, he will have to surrender his current
length and wait years for his hair to even out, or purchase extensions and pay
several hundred dollars for their installation. Put differently, what was stolen
here was labor, time, dignity, bodily autonomy, and integrity. The spectacle,
one of public and cultural lashing and disciplining, is similar and of the same
vein of performance as the lynching, public lashing, routine police contact,
questioning and harassment; a sociolegal politics of discipline, displacement
and divesture from the commons visited on Black people, Black citizens, and
their bodies.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I want to meditate on and with the words of Maria
Grahn-Farley and Anthony Farley. First, Grahn-Farley writes:
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Julia Reinstein, A Black High School Wrestler Was Reportedly Forced by A Ref to Cut
Off His Dreadlocks, BUZZFEED NEWS, (Dec. 21, 2018 3:42 P.M.), https://www.buzzfeed
news.com/article/juliareinstein/black-high-school-wrestler-forced-haircut-dreadlocks-referee.
77. Id.
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The law of slavery has not been forgotten by the law of
segregation; the law of segregation has not been forgotten by the law
of neosegregation. The law guarding the gates of slavery,
segregation, and neosegregation has not forgotten its origin; it
remembers its father and its grandfather before that. It knows what
master it serves; it knows what color to count.78
In this short passage Grahn-Farley argues that the law of slavery has
not disappeared, despite being formally overturned, and instead operates as
a type of master precedent. The law of slavery itself may have passed away
formally, but its logics, culture, interests, and silent understandings are born
again—almost as a type of genetic makeup—in the laws of segregation and
neosegregation, which is the current moment. The precedent of law and
lawfulness then, is a precedent and modus operandi to serve White interests
and count those interests as wholly intelligible and valid under law. This
jurisprudential, genetic makeup then provides the backdrop for what this
chapter is calling the strict scrutiny of Black life. The term scrutiny comes
from the word scrutator:
One who examines or investigates or spec. One whose office
it is to examine or investigate closely, esp. one who acts as an
examiner of votes at an election, etc.; a scrutineer.79 Whereas
scrutiny is defined as: Investigation, critical inquiry; an instance of
this. Formerly often (now rarely) const. into, †of.
From these two definitions it is clear that scrutiny itself—even when
outside of the formal legal theater—is an act of extra legal review, to
determine, via close examination, investigation and critical inquiry, whether
one’s presence, access to the polity and goods and services is warranted,
proper and beyond reproach.80 Put differently, strict scrutiny acts as a sort
of TSA checkpoint for access to the fruits of whiteness as property and/or
full citizenship. The law of slavery, the laws of segregation, and the laws of
neosegregation function as the gatekeepers and formal borderlands that bind
Black people and Blackness to servitude and subordination while
simultaneously marking, remarking and regarding whiteness and white
people as citizens worthy of the birthright of the manners Jefferson speaks
78. Maria Grahn-Farley, The Master Norm, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1215, 1227 (2004).
79. SCRUTATOR, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu:
2444/view/Entry/173762 (last visited Dec. 27, 2019).
80. SCRUTINY, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS. https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu:
2444/view/Entry/173778?rskey=h3Dt1b&result=1&isAdvanced=false (last visited Dec. 27, 2019).
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of. These laws mark Black people as both fungible and fugitive; always,
already slaves on the run or on reprieve, whereas strict scrutiny is the
mechanism for this branding. It detects what Spillers has called the
hieroglyphics of race and reinstitutes, articulates and mandates the politics
of the plantation in the present. To attain a modicum of safe passage—
similar to that of the slave pass—the Black body must be made subservient
and perform the acts of “servitude or bondage for life.” In Supreme Court
jurisprudence this looks like remaking oneself in the ocular desires of white
supremacy, specifically, masking those “immutable characteristics” for safeish “passing.” The masking functions as a type of “voluntary” transmutation
that reifies Black people and Blackness as naturally outside of law’s
protections, while also validating the current racial power structure.
Whiteness’s supremacy is remade in the quotidian bowing and transmutation
of Black citizenship to one of servitude; thus, is the cost of “equal protection
under the law.”
Requests for equality and freedom will always fail. Why?
Because the fact of need itself means that the request will fail. The
request for equality and freedom, for rights, will fail whether the
request is granted or denied. The request is produced through an
injury. The initial injury is the marking of bodies for less—less
respect, less land, less freedom, less education, less. The mark must
be made on the flesh because that is where we start from. Childhood
is where we begin and, under conditions of hierarchy, that childhood
is already marked. The mark organizes, orients, and differentiates
our otherwise common flesh. The mark is race, the mark is gender,
the mark is class, the mark is. The mark is all there is to the reality
of those essences—race, gender, class, and so on—that are said to
precede existence. The mark is a system. Property and law follow
the mark. And so it goes.81
In the excerpt above Anthony Farley provides a critical review of the
law’s inability to provide equality, freedom, and justice. He argues, not
dissimilar from Derrick Bell in Racial Realism, that racism (i.e., classism,
patriarchy, etc.) are not only here to stay but are irreparable by calls and
requests for equality and freedom.82 Further, he argues, that the fact of harm
is proof of the failure, regardless of whether requests for redress are heeded
or denied. This is because these failures are not mere failures of law, but
markings of law and culture. Like Spillers, Farley points to these structural
and interpersonal harms as markings on the flesh; brandings that are seared
81.
82.

Anthony P. Farley, Perfecting Slavery, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 225, 256 (2005).
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992).
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and recalled upon sight. This marking, branding, hieroglyph “organizes,
orients and differentiates.” In his estimation, law is incapable of remedy
because law is a precedent of a system of othering, dehumanizing, and
flagging for hierarchy and natural proximity to social death. These markings
signal the marked excess to humanity and to citizenship, not as part and
parcel of the commons. The mark itself may be inarticulable, because it
predates what is considered necessary to be said and remarked upon.
Property and law maintain these marks via metalanguages of race, class, sex
etc. but cannot undo them because their purpose to maintain the precedence
of their existence. Put differently, law cannot undo its own very foundations,
its central logic is respect for precedence, for the nature of property and both
the nature of property and the function of precedence is to maintain what was
before.
This precedence, regardless of seemingly progressive intervention,
mandates the strict scrutinization of Black life and presence; Black furtivity
is baked into it. It is a central feature of law, as a part of its genetic makeup.
Therefore, all laws, even those seen as most “pro-Black” contain a preceding
logic of Blackness as less, as other, and as a slave to a master. Strict scrutiny
then, is the mechanism of maintenance. It narrows the reach of Blackness as
inside of law and lawfulness—access to certain protections and curtailing of
certain violence—while simultaneously expanding the methods by which
Black people can be rendered outside of law (“non-immutable
characteristics,” furtive gestures, insurmountable burdens of proof and
broad notions of “reasonable suspicion” and “probable cause”).
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